Abstract. Atmel's CryptoMemory devices are non-volatile memories with cryptographically secured access control. Recently, the authentication mechanism of these devices have been shown to be severely vulnerable. More precisely, to recover the secret key the published attack requires only two to six days of computation on a cluster involving 200 CPU cores. In this work, we identified and applied theoretical improvements to this attack and mapped it to a reconfigurable computing cluster, known as RIVYERA. Our solution provides significantly higher performance exceeding the previous implementation by a factor of 7.27, revealing the secret key obtained from the internal state in 0.55 days on average using only 30 authentication frames.
Introduction
In 2002 Atmel introduced a secure memory device with authentication called CryptoMemory [2, 13] which is basically an Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) augmented with a secure access control unit.
Due to the low cost and simplicity of deployment the device is employed in a wide range of commercial products, e.g., as key storage of the HDCP system in NVIDIA's graphic cards [16] , Labgear's digital satellite receivers [15] , Microsoft's Zune Player [7] and SanDisk's Sansa Connect [9] using the CryptoMemory as part of their DRM system implementation. Further examples of CryptoMemory deployment are printer and printer cartridge manufacturers like Dell, Ricoh, Xerox, and Samsung [14] . Furthermore, Atmel's CryptoMemory is placed in authentication tokens from Digitrade [6] and Datakey Electronics [1] .
The specification of the Atmel cipher was kept secret till ACM CCS 2010 where Garcia et al. presented their findings obtained from reverse engineering [8] . They also showed significant weaknesses by analyzing the authentication protocol. One year later Biryukov et al. published a more efficient method which -with a probability of 50% -is capable of extracting the secret key from 30 authentication recordings [4] . This attack runs on a computing cluster with 200 Central Processing Unit (CPU) cores and needs two to six days to recover the secret. Another attack based on power side-channels has also been reported in [3] . This attack lasting a few minutes, however, needs physical access to the device and a special side-channel measurement setup to extract the secret key from about 100 power traces.
Our contribution: In this work, we improve and map the best known cryptanalytic attack on CryptoMemory devices published in [4] to special-purpose hardware, namely the RIVYERA S3-5000 reconfigurable computing cluster [17] . Our improvement of the cryptanalytic setup in addition to our hardware-based implementation leads to a speedup factor of 7.27 compared to the previously reported results. In short, our implementation is able to extract the internal state of the cipher from 30 authentication frames within 0.55 days on average which impressively demonstrates that none of the products mentioned above can be considered as secure. Given a cluster such as RIVYERA, our attack configuration is also a power-efficient solution. For a run with 30 frames, the hardware cluster consumes 8.6KWh instead of 245.76KWh the CPU cluster per attacked device.
Outline: In Section 2 we provide preliminary information on CryptoMemory, previously published attacks and RIVYERA. Improvements of the attack are presented in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 deals with our implementation architectures before we compare our results in Section 6 with those of a CPU-based implementation. Finally, our conclusions are given by Section 7.
Background
In this section we briefly restate the required background of our work. The section includes specification of the targeted cipher, the underlying protocol, the attack of [4] , and our computing cluster.
CryptoMemory Stream Cipher
The cipher state consists of four shift registers -the left, middle, right and feedback register. 
Right Register:
For every cipher tick, the input a ∈ F 8 2 is processed during the transition of S to the successor state S . The state transition is executed in three steps. First, the input values a and f are merged and XORed to several bits in the l, m, and r registers. Second, the left, middle, and right registers are shifted to the right and their feedback value is calculated with the help of a bitwise left rotation and modular addition. Third, the f register is shifted to the left and the new calculated cipher output nibble becomes the new first element of f . Figure 1 provides an overview of the cipher operation. The core operations of the cipher are given by the following definitions:
2 is defined as:
Definition 5. Let a and b be defined as: a ∈ F 8 2 and b = a ⊕ f 0 f 1 . Further, the successor state S = (l , m , r , f ) is defined as follows: Definition 6. The cipher output function is defined as follows while i is a bitselector:
Definition 7. Let suc be the state transition function with input a, S and output S = suc(a, S). Further, suc n (a, S) is defined as multiple application of suc transforming S into its n-th successor state.
suc n (a, S) := suc n−1 (a, suc(a, S)) f or n > 1
Mutual Authentication Protocol
Apart from the authentication between reader and memory, the authentication protocol is used to initialize the CryptoMemory device and requires the exchange of three messages. The first one contains a nonce nt ∈ (F 16 sent from reader to the memory device. As the last message, the memory device calculates its authenticator at ∈ (F 4 2 ) 16 and sends it to the reader. Figure 2 depicts the protocol from which the resulting tuple (nr, nt, ar, and at) is defined as an authentication frame. The authenticators ar and at are made by concatenating output nibbles of specific cipher states.
at 0 := 15, at 1 := 15, at i := output(S i+23 ) i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 15}
A Probabilistic Attack on CryptoMemory
This section introduces the published attack by Biryukov et al. [4] which requires knowledge of some eavesdropped authentication frames to reconstruct the cipher state S 8 and S 4 . Then a meet-in-the-middle attack is applied to extract the secret key k from the cipher states. The reconstruction of S 8 is the most computationally intensive part and is based on three phases. We start with the generation of state candidates for the right register r. Based on these given candidates we similarly obtain state hypotheses for the left register l. As the third step, we finally compute candidates matching the middle register m for each given left-right register tuple.
Right Register. The attack is based on an exhaustive search for all possible S 24 states of the right register r and uses a correlation test to filter invalid guesses. This is performed by guessing r, calculating the register output for 16 consecutive ticks and counting the equivalent bits to ar 14 , ar 15 , at i for i = 2, . . . 15. If the sum of coincident bits is below a certain threshold T r , the candidate is discarded. These steps are repeated until all candidates for r are checked.
Left Register. The next step is to recover the left register and is repeated for each remaining candidate of r. First, lk i is defined as the intermediate output of l and l S0 = {l 0 , l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 , l 6 } as the starting point for the calculation. In fact, some bits of lk are known -in particular the cipher output bits that cannot be created by the right register.
Combining the state update function and the state output function, this results in the following equations for the first six output nibbles of the left register:
The equations above show that lk i depends only on two variables. Based on these equations the following sets are defined which hold tuples of l i and l j .
With the known parts of lk i , H i can be reduced to only those that match the aforementioned equations. The cardinality of each set strongly depends on the number of known bits in lk i . Let N H (lk i ) be the number of known bits in lk i . Note that register cells are used in more than one set. For example, l 3 is part of H 0 and H 3 .
and H i+3 can be further reduced by keeping only tuples that consist in l 3−i and create the intersection set H i,i+3 . Additionally, H 0 , H 3 , and H 6 are combined to H 0,3,6 = {l 0 , l 3 , l 6 } to do a similar reduction by keeping only possible intersection values. A yet unresolved problem is to choose a good starting point S 0 to maximize the reduction effect. A solution to this problem Ψ (i) can be obtained from
This function considers the reduction effect on A = {l 0 , l 1 , l 3 , l 4 , l 6 } of a chosen starting state S 0 . Let J = arg max 1≤i≤7 Ψ (i); then, the optimal starting point is S 24+J to have the maximum reduction effect on A. Theorem 1 points out that some register cells exist with more impact on the output stream than others. Hence, the best starting point is the one with the most known bits in A. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [5] . Note that Ψ (i) is defined over 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 and if J = 7, only lk i up to i = 8 can be used for the reduction. Due to the fact that J can be at minimum 1, the (lk −1 , lk 5 ) tuple can be combined with H 1 similar to the intersection set H 0,3,6 for further reduction.
After the reduction steps, the remaining set H 1 and A are combined to reconstruct all possible internal states S 24+J of the left register. In order to cover all lk i the created candidates are clocked forward and finally backward from l S0 to the original state S 24 . Keep in mind for this step that l 0 and l 1 has to be XORed with their corresponding feedback byte to get the original values. For further reduction all restored candidates are filtered with the same correlation test as that of the right register but using T l as the chosen threshold.
Middle Register. The most time-consuming part is the recovery of the middle register that we mapped to hardware as explained in Section 5. Assume that possible candidate pairs for the left and the right register have been generated according to the two steps expressed before. These candidates represent the state S 24 . The following steps are then performed for each candidate pair.
Let mk i be the output bits of the middle register. Some bits of mk i can be restored with the help of rk i and lk i . Note that mk i are the four right most bits of m j . Due to that, information about m 0 , m 7 , m 8 , . . . , m 21 is extracted. In order to use all gathered information about the middle register cells the attack starts from the state S 30 .
Depending on the output and update function the following equations are extracted:
Similar to the reconstruction of the left register, all possible tuples for the middle register cells of state S 30 are grouped together to form the sets Q i . For example, Q 0 holds all tuples of m 7 and m 0 that are able to create mk 7 . In comparison to the reconstruction of the left register, there are some known bits of m i that do not depend on other register cells. The cardinality of Q i also correlates with the number of known bits in mk i+7 , m i+7 , and m i+6 . Figure 3 shows which information is used by each Q i . It is shown that all gained information is used in the sets and which relations they have. In the following it is explained how these relations are used to minimize the number of possible S 30 candidates. Q i and Q i+1 can be shrunk by keeping only tuples that exist in the intersection set Q i,i+1 with the same pattern value m j . To maximize the reduction effect a good starting point needs to be chosen again. Let I = arg min 0≤i≤8 |Q i | where |Q i | is the cardinality of Q i . Then, the reduction process is started from Q I = {m j , m k } with k = 0 or k = j − 1. In other words, each Q i is compared with Q i+1 for I ≤ i ≤ 7. Q i is also compared with Q i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ I.
Now, the reduced Q i sets are combined to fill the middle register cells six downto three of state S 30 . This partially filled register is checked immediately by
This
As the final step of the state recovering process, the complete internal state S 24 = (l, m, r, f ) is clocked backwards to state S 8 and the corresponding output is compared with ar 13 to ar 0 . This final step usually filters all invalid candidates. A correct state S 8 of a frame only persists if it was previously not discarded by the correlation tests performed on the right and left register candidates.
RIVYERA Special-Purpose Hardware Cluster
In this work we employ the reconfigurable RIVYERA computing cluster system which is specially designed to process cryptanalytic tasks. The Redesign of the Incredibly Versatile Yet Energy-efficient, Reconfigurable Architecture (RIVYERA) cluster is populated with 128 Spartan-3 XC3S5000 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) distributed over 16 card modules. The modules are plugged into a backplane that provides a systolic ring bus interconnect for high-performance communication. Additionally, a host PC is attached to the ring bus via PCI Express and both systems are installed in a 19" rackmount system [10, 11, 18, 19] .
Advanced Candidate Filtering
The attack described previously creates candidates for each register sequentially. The candidates for the left register are chosen from the output stream of a right register candidate, and the middle register candidates are based on the output stream of a left and a right register candidate. The output function of the left and the right register is a simple XOR. The XOR operation of the binary complement x 0 and x 1 of an arbitrary x 0 and x 1 results in the same output y.
The update function of both register acts as following:
The probability that the condition in Equation (2) is not given for a register is So the probability that the condition is not met during this time is (1 − 1 32 ) 16 = 0.6017. Summarizing the previous facts leads to a 60% chance that r as well as r produce the same output stream. In case r passes the correlation test, r passes the correlation test as well. This behavior also occurs for left register candidates. Due to the fact that the left register candidates are only based on the cipher output stream and the right register output stream, r and r produce the same left register candidate list. The middle register candidates are also based only on the output streams lk and rk which means that the tuples (l, r), (l, r), (l, r) and (l, r) produces the same middle register candidate list, when the conditions in Equation (2) are satisfied during register output generation.
The attack performs inverted cipher ticks for a register candidate triple (l, m, r) and checks whether it matches to the known ar i nibbles. For an inverted cipher tick a modular subtraction is necessary which is defined as follows:
Note that the modular subtraction is non-injective. In case of x = y, the result of the modular subtraction can be 0 or 2 n − 1. The attack, should consider both cases; in the later steps the wrong guess will be filtered out when not matching with ar i .
For the modulo subtraction we observe a similar behavior as for the modulo addition. The condition in Equation (3) is due to the non-injectivity of the operator.
Summarizing all these facts leads to the following conclusion. The attack performs inverse cipher ticks for the triple (r, m, l) to check its consistency with the known ar i nibbles. If r, r and l, l exist in the list of candidates, we validate the triples (l, m, r), (l, m, r), (l, m, r) at the same time. Also, if (l, m, r) is not the correct internal state, (l, m, r), (l, m, r), and (l, m, r) will not be the correct one either. Therefore, we can remove l and r from the list of candidates which generate the same output stream as l and r. For a remaining candidate S 8 the complementary left and right register candidates have to be checked separately if they are feasible as well. Our experiments have shown that with this additional filtering the number of right and left register candidates are reduced to 68%. In total we only process -on average -46.24% of the original left and right candidate list.
Mapping Components to Hardware
Most parts of the attack will be executed in software and only the most timeconsuming parts are mapped to hardware. In this context, the interfaces between software and hardware are of major importance to allow a smooth transition of data in both directions. As a first step we implement the calculations of the middle register reconstruction process in hardware. The transition from software to hardware at this point requires only a very limited number of data transfers. Moreover, this is indeed the most time-consuming part (about 98.8 % of the attack time).
Attacking m begins with the reconstruction of Q i and searches for the smallest set. The subsequent reduction on this step compares possible register cell candidates. In our hardware implementation we should merge these two steps so that the generation and reduction of the register cell candidates are performed at once. In order to check whether m i is part of Q j and Q j+1 it is necessary to check if (a) m i contains the known bits from the fragmentary middle register output stream and (b) there must be at least one m i+1 and one m i−1 each of which contains the fragmentary known bits and is not removed. Each of them also must be able to create in conjunction with m i an arbitrary m k+1 and m k , respectively, that each contains the corresponding known bits. If both conditions are fulfilled, m i is a valid register cell candidate.
Due to our merging technique we do not know which set is the smallest one. So we always start the generation with Q 8 and continue the calculation iteratively until we have created Q 0 . With Q 0 we perform the generation and reduction steps again for all sets from Q 0 to Q 8 . During the creation of the sets, either register cell candidates from previously generated sets are used or the candidates are generated with the help of the known mk i bits as described in Section 5.1.
After generation the valid tuples need to be stored in memory. One problem is that we do not know in advance how many valid tuples we will receive but we have to allocate a fixed amount of memory in hardware. So we assume the worst case memory complexity for the Q i sets: 2 7 · 2 7 · 14 · 9 bits. This translates to 126 Block Random-Access Memory (BRAM) blocks with 18kB each, but a Spartan-3 5000 only provides 108 BRAMs. Due to the sequential nature of the reduction, an on-the-fly calculation of the candidates will result in an enormous increase of time. An alternative method is to store the information of valid tuples in relation matrices. In a relation matrix the information of the register cell values is encoded in the position of a special flag which indicates if the register cell combination is valid or not. The usage of relation matrices reduces the memory complexity to: 2 7 · 2 7 · 9 bits, which needs in total only 9 BRAM blocks to hold the necessary information. This storage method directly leads to the next challenge: the efficient reconstruction of register cell values. Obviously, due to the cell candidate dependencies a bitwise search for each candidate is ineffective.
Finally, the hardware instantiation of an Inverse Cipher Tick (ICT) is not trivial as well. Each modular subtraction for an ICT is non-injective so for some values the result is ambiguous and incorrect values need to be sorted out a few ICTs later. This backtracking behavior complicates a straightforward hardware implementation using parallelism or pipelining techniques so that we decided to implement multiple iterative ICT modules instead for maximum performance.
Implementation
In this section we give an overview of the hardware implementation of the attack including advanced candidate filtering. Each of the 128 FPGAs is configured with the same configuration. The design contains two independent attack cores to which a controller forwards data depending on which module is waiting for a new dataset. Each attack component contains a module to generate Q i tables that iteratively creates register cell candidates and stores them in the BRAMs. Then, a module reconstructs complete middle register candidates from the previously generated relation matrices (Buffered Pipeline) and distributes the candidates to a free ICT module. The ICT module performs inverse cipher ticks and validates the candidate by examining its compliance with ar i . Figure 4 depicts the toplevel design of our implementation. 
Generating Q i Tables
The Q i generating module iteratively fills Q i with valid register cell tuples and starts with Q 8 . First, the design uses just a counter and the partial reconstructed output stream to reduce the amount of possible candidates for m 15 , m 14 and m 13 . The possible register cell candidates are then fed into a modular adder that calculates m 21 and m 20 which are directly verified by the known bits. Based on the results, a BRAM block for Q 8 is filled with a stream of bits that represents valid tuples for m 15 and m 14 . After the calculation of Q 8 is completed, the module continues with the calculation of Q 7 . At this point possible previously defined candidates for m 14 are present in memory and the module repeats these steps until Q 0 is generated. Next it performs the same procedure again in the reverse direction, i.e., from Q 1 to Q 8 to achieve a maximum effect reducing the number of possible register cell candidates. Figure 5 shows an overview of the structure of the module. 
Buffered Pipeline
The goal of this unit is to efficiently extract complete middle register candidates from Q i within the BRAM memory. In most cases the relation matrices in memory are rarely filled and a challenge is to find the bits set in Q i and decode their corresponding position one after another.
In order to decode the position of a set bit in a block a priority decoder can be used. However for a large blocksize, e.g., 32-bit, the complexity of the priority decoder grows enormously requiring a lot of resources. To save the resources we filter one set bit out of the block and use a simple decoder to extract the position of this single set bit. The filtering is realized with the following approach:
Let α be a binary block. Instead of using a priority decoder one can calculate α ∧ (α ⊕ (α − 1)) which contains at most a single one bit and passes this to a binary decoder. This process can be iteratively repeated by replacing α by α ⊕ (α ∧ (α ⊕ (α − 1))). For clarification an example is given in the following:
This technique always filters the right most set bit from an arbitrary binary block. In our implementation this filtering process is repeated until each one bit in a block is appropriately decoded.
Inverse Cipher Tick
The ICT module is an iterative module which performs inverse cipher ticks until S 8 of a cipher state candidate is reached or a candidate does not generate the known output nibbles ar i . The module starts with the receipt of an incoming candidate of S 24 and forwards it to its First In, First Out (FIFO) unit. A candidate coming out of the FIFO is fed into the modular subtractor which calculates the right most cells of the three main state registers. Due to the non-injective property of modular subtraction, the output of the modular subtractor is selected by a special flag (0 by default). A decision unit calculates these flags and ensures that -in case of multiple ambiguous results -all possible combinations are considered. Two final modules update the feedback register and validate with ar i . In case of a positive result, the newly generated state is fed into the FIFO for the next ICT-until either finally S 8 is reached or validation fails in a later step. Figure 6 depicts a block diagram of the ICT module. 
Results
In this section we present the results of our hardware implementation obtained using Xilinx ISE Foundation 14.3 for synthesis and place and route. The design with two attack cores of which each contains 17 ICT modules is synthesized and runs at the frequency of 100MHz. The utilized resources on each Spartan-3 5000 are shown in Table 1 .
Essentially, the attack speed strongly depends on the frequency of operation and the number of attack components and ICT modules per core. The integrated FIFO component of each module has a data width of 125 bits which results in the utilization of 4 BRAM primitives on a Spartan-3. The complete hardware design is limited by BRAM blocks, i.e., a generic design configuration with two attack cores based on BRAM can only instantiate 7 ICT modules per core. For a better resource utilization a dedicated LUT-based version of the ICT modules was generated to instantiate the internal FIFO. This alternative implementation allows us to instantiate 10 additional ICT modules per core. Table 1 shows the resource consumptions of both ICT versions on a Spartan-3 5000. Next we compare the throughput of the CPU-based cluster implementation in [4] with our hardware implementation on RIVYERA. Note that exact cycle counts are not available for the implementation given in [4] . Therefore we restrict our comparison to the data as shown in Table 2 .
In order to determine the attack speed of our solution, we measure the validation time for a left and right register pair. 300 randomly generated frames are chosen to compute the average time needed for register pair validation. On average one attack unit is able to check one left/right register candidate tuple in 0.8 seconds. To have a 50% chance for a successful attack we need 30 frames similarly as stated in [4] . On average 23 right and 2
19.527 left register candidates are generated out of 30 frames what leads to a total running time of the attack to reconstruct the internal state in about 13 hours (0.55 days).
Apart from performance, the cost for running an attack is of utmost importance. The CPU-based attack was run on a rented Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) cluster but unfortunately, RIVYERA is not for rent. For a fair comparison, we therefore compare the running costs of the attack by estimating the power consumption for both attack implementations. The RIVYERA S-3 5000 takes on average 650W while two Intel Xeon L5640 CPUs including peripherals approximately demand (60W · 2) + 40W = 160W [12] for the complete system. To run the attack in the given time as stated in [4] , at least 16 such computing systems are required. The power consumption in Table 2 shows again the advantage of special-purpose hardware over CPU-based attack clusters. Despite the performance improvement with the Spartan-3 5000, we can achieve even higher performance with later FPGA devices. In particular, the RIVYERA S6-LX150 which can be equipped with 256 Spartan-6 LX150 offers by far more logic and performance but was not available in the course of this work. However, to provide at least estimates, we adapted our design for the Spartan-6 LX150 on which we can instantiate the double amount of attack cores with 17 ICT modules each. Additionally, we can run the design at double clock frequency due to the newer FPGA technology (200MHz) which results in an additional performance speed-up by factor of four.
Conclusion
The hardware implementation presented in this work improves the attack on CryptoMemory devices by Biryukov et al. [4] by introducing an additional candidate filtering step reducing the computation complexity to a half. By mapping the most time consuming parts to FPGA hardware, our solution runs in total 7.27 times faster than the previously reported results using 30 authentication frames. This enables the complete recovery of the secret internal state of the CryptoMemory cipher on average in less than 0.55 days. Finally, our hardware attack is 28.58 times cheaper considering power consumption compared to [4] using a CPU-based cluster.
